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1. Introduction 
The first electricity privatisations in Latin America took place in Chile in the 1980s, followed by Argentina 
in 1992, and some privatisations in Brazil. These restructurings also split the sector into separate generation, 
transmission, and distribution companies, a model which was later adopted in Peru, Bolivia, Colombia and 
elsewhere.  The Spanish electricity companies, especially Endesa, have taken a leading role in these 
privatisations from the beginning. The process has led to loss of jobs, insecurity of employment, and worse 
conditions for electricity workers. It has also contributed to a number of social and economic problems, 
including problems of price levels, reliability, and government guarantees.  
 
This paper reviews the experience in 3 main sections: 
 
 privatisation and multinational companies: an overview of the activity of the three major Spanish 
companies – Endesa, Iberdrola, and Union Fenosa – and a summary of the activity of other 
multinationals which have entered and in some cases exited from the electricity sector in Latin 
America; 
 the impact on labour: a review of available evidence on the effects on pay and conditions, 
outsourcing, employment, and workers‘ lives 
 social, political and economic impacts: a summary of problems with prices, public guarantees, and 
performance 
 
A concluding section discusses policy issues for trade unions and governments. 
 
2. Privatisation and multinational companies  
2.1. The Spanish multinationals 
The Spanish electricity companies have been prominent in the privatisations in the region. This is partly 
because of the historic and linguistic links between Spain and Latin America, and partly because the Spanish 
electricity companies themselves were privatised in the early 1990s, and saw international expansion as one 
of the opportunities available to them.  
 
2.1.1. Endesa  
Endesa is the largest Spanish electricity company, and operates in 13 countries in total. It is the leading 
private electricity multinational in Latin America, where it has been active since the early 1990s.  In 2004 
Latin America provided 20% of Endesa‘s total income. 1 
 
It is the leading electricity supplier in Chile, Argentina, Colombia and Peru, the third electric utility in Brazil 
and distributes power in five of the six main cities in the region (Buenos Aires, Bogotá, Santiago de Chile, 
Lima and Río de Janeiro). In 2004 ENDESA owned a total installed capacity of 14,053 MW and sold 52,314 
GWh to 10.9 million customers. Endesa has subsidiaries in all three subsectors – generation, distribution, and 
transmission. 
 
Although Endesa plans to invest $2.9bn in Latin America over the next few years, this will be to maintain its 
existing assets rather than new investment. Endesa is actively seeking more local partners, so that investment 
will come from local sources rather than Spain .2  The company is insisting on higher returns than it obtains 
in Europe, to justify the risks on  Latin American investments and to recoup previous losses: ―returns on 
investment will have to compensate for foreign currency volatility risk and capital costs ….  the returns 
would have to cover the company's losses in the region from the 2001-2002 economic crisis that led to an 
electricity consumption trough‖.3   
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In Argentina Endesa is involved in negotiations and lawsuits with the government to try and retain its 
investments, reclaim the dollarisation  agreement and increase electricity prices to improve profits. The 
Argentinean president at one stage accused Endesa‘s subsidiary Edesur of deliberately creating a blackout to 
increase pressure for price rises.4 
 
Endesa owns 14% of  Empresa Propietaria de la Red, which is developing the Siepac project, an electricity 
interconnection connecting Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama through a 
1,880 km 230 kV trunk line scheduled for completion in 2006. The estimated budget for this project is US$ 
320 million. 
 
The map and table below show Endesa‘s subsidiaries in Latin America in 2005. 
 
Table 1.  Table: Endesa investment and employees by country in Latin America, 2005 
Country Employess % of Endesa investment in Latin America 
Chile 4,032 40% 
Colombia 1,220 24% 
Brazil 2,924 19% 
Peru 835 10% 
Argentina 2,678 7% 
Source: Endesa Annual Report 2004 
Table 2.  Endesa subsidiaries in Latin America 2005 
Country/pais Company/empresa Sector 
% owned by 
Endesa 
Argentina Costanera Electricity generation 64.3 
Argentina Dock Sud Electricity generation 69.8 
Argentina Edesur Electricity distribution 99.4 
Argentina El Chocon Electricity generation 65.2 
Argentina Yacylec Electricity transmission 22.2 
Brazil Cachoeira Dourada Electricity generation 99.6 
Brazil Ampla Electricity distribution 91.9 
Brazil Cien Electricity transmission 100 
Brazil COELCE Electricity distribution 58.9 
Brazil Fortaleza Electricity generation 100 
Chile Chilectra Electricity distribution 98.2 
Chile Endesa Chile Electricity generation 60 
Colombia Betania Electricity generation 85.6 
Colombia CODENSA Electricity distribution 48.5 
Colombia EMGESA Electricity generation 48.5 
DominicanRepublic CEPM Electricity generation 40 
Peru Edegel Electricity generation 63.6 
Peru Edelnor Electricity distribution 60 
Peru Etevensa Electricity generation 60 
Peru Piura Electricity generation 60 
Source: PSIRU Database, Endesa Annual Report 2004 
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Chart A. Map of Endesa’s holdings in Latin America, 2005 
 
Source: Endesa Annual Report 2004 
 
 
 
2.1.2. Union Fenosa  
The Unión Fenosa Group is Spain‘s third largest electricity company.  In Latin America it is present as an 
operator in electricity generation and distribution in Colombia and Panama; in the generation markets of 
Mexico, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic; and in electricity distribution in Guatemala and 
Nicaragua.  Its distribution operations in Dominican Republic were re-nationalised in 2003 (with 
compensation). 5  Unión Fenosa's total international business has installed generating capacity of 2,723 MW, 
and electricity is distributed to 4.9 million customers.6 
 
Union Fenosa‘s profits in Latin America increased in 2004, and power distributed per employee in the 
international distribution business increased by 15.1%, but the company strategy is to consolidate, not extend 
its investments. 
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In Colombia, Nicaragua, Guatemala and Panama, the company has cut over 380 jobs in 2004-2005, 
including the use of outsourcing.7 
 
Table 3.  Union Fenosa subsidiaries in Latin America 2005 
Country/pais Company/empresa Sector % 
Colombia Electricaribe Electricity distribution 71.5 
Colombia Electrocosta Electricity 71 
Colombia EPSA Electricity 62.6 
CostaRica La Joya Electricity generation 65 
Guatemala Distribuidora Eléctrica de Oriente Electricity distribution 92.8 
Guatemala Distribuidora Eléctrica de Occidente Electricity distribution 90.8 
Mexico Union Fenosa (Mexico) Electricity generation 100 
Nicaragua Disnorte Electricity distribution 79.5 
Nicaragua Dissur Electricity distribution 79.5 
Panama Chiriqui Electricity distribution 51 
Panama Metro-oeste Electricity distribution 51 
Dominican republic Generadora Palamara La Vega Electricity generation 100 
 
 
 
Chart B. Union Fenosa in Latin America 
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2.1.3. Iberdrola 
Iberdrola is the second largest Spanish electricity company. It has investments in Brazil, Bolivia, Guatemala 
and Mexico. 8 Its main presence is in a group of distribution companies in the northeast of Brazil. It has 
recently invested in a 520MW gas-fired generator in the region, all of the output from which will be bought 
by Iberdrola‘s distribution companies. The cost of this investment is all derived from the surplus of the 
Brazilian energy operations, not from capital from Spain.9  Two of Iberdrola‘s Brazilian distribution 
companies, Coelba and Cosern, have issued bonds worth $143m and $40m respectively: again, this is local 
money borrowed by the local operators, who all (including the third one, Celpe10) have their own 
independent credit ratings, not funds from Iberdrola.11 12  
 
Table 4.  Iberdrola subsidiaries in Latin America, 2005 
Country/pais Company/empresa Sector % 
Bolivia Cade Energy 59.3 
Bolivia Electropaz Electricity distribution 56.8 
Brazil Celpe Electricity distribution 40 
Brazil Coelba Electricity distribution 42.6 
Brazil Cosern Electricity distribution 9.5 
Brazil Neoenergia (formerly Guaraniana) Electricity 39 
Brazil Itapebi Electricity 40.5 
Guatemala Eegsa Electricity 39.6 
Mexico Altamira III/IV Electricity generation 100 
Mexico Enertek Electricity generation  
Mexico Femsa-Titan Electricity generation  
Mexico Monterrey Electricity generation 100 
Source: PSIRU Database; Iberdrola Annual Report 2004 
 
 
2.2. Other multinational investors 
Other multinationals which have invested in electricity in Latin America include companies from other 
European countries, and companies from the USA. The most important of the European companies is the 
French state-owned company Electricité de France (EdF), which was one of the first and most active 
investors from the early 1990s. Since 2003 EdF has been attempting to reduce its investments in Latin 
America, especially in Argentina.  Tractebel, the energy section of the Suez group, which is a French-
Belgian multinational, also retains significant investment in electricity in Latin America, but suspended 
investment in Brazil because  government policies put Tractebel ―in an unfair position by forcing it to 
compete with state-controlled generators‖ 13Two UK electricity companies invested and then left the region: 
United Utilities abandoned IEBA, its Argentine subsidiary, in September 2003 by allowing it to default on its 
debts, and National Grid sold its 42% stake in the transmission company of Argentina in March 2004. The 
major German electricity companies never made any significant investment in the region. 
 
AES is the largest USA firm which remains in Latin America and is likely to continue for the immediate 
future, but even AES has been reducing its holdings eg in the Dominican republic. It has bought shares from 
other multinationals who are leaving; it has systematically renegotiated the debts of all its subsidiaries in 
Brazil14 - after defaulting on the loans due from its subsidiary Eletrobras - and in Chile; 15 in Venezuela, AES 
promised Union Fenosa the right to buy some assets in Colombia in return for its agreement not to enter a 
bidding war for the Venezuelan utility.16   One or two smaller USA operators such as Alliant and PPL may 
also remain. A number of USA electricity companies formerly invested but have now withdrawn or are in 
the process of doing so. These include: AEP/CSW; Enron (which still owns Brazilian distributor Elektro); 
Reliant; Entergy; Duke Power; First Energy/GPU; NRG/Xcel; Southern Company/Mirant. CMS, El Paso and 
PSEG are also unlikely to be significant players in future, due either to their own problems or a commitment 
already made to exit these investments.  
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Financial investors have started to take over some of the investments sold by MNCs. This is a trend which is 
happening not only in Latin America, and not only in electricity, but in utilities worldwide. The most 
prominent one is the (state-owned) UK company CDC, a financial investor which has been actively investing 
in privatised energy companies in developing countries since 2002. Others include large private international 
finance groups, such as Goldman Sachs, which now owns the investments of the Cogentrix group, including 
a power station in the Dominican Republic. These financial investors now include Latin American groups, 
including  Petrobras Energia, owned by the Brazilian (state-owned) company Petrobras, which holds 
investments in  Argentina, and Dolphin group of Argentina, which also holds investments in Argentina.  
Table 5.  Major non-Spanish international investors in electricity in Latin America 
Group Home country Type of company Example investments 
EdF France Electricity state-owned Light, Norte Fluminense (Brazil), Central Saltillo 
etc (Mexico), Los Nihuiles, Distrocuyo (Arg) 
EdP Portugal Electricity state-owned Bandeirante, Enerpeixe (Brazil), Eegsa 
(Guatemala) 
Tractebel-Suez France/Belgium Electricity, private Gerasul (Brazil), Colbun, ElectroAndina (Chile), 
Enersur (Peru) 
AES USA Electricity, private Edelap, Eden, Edes etc (Arg), Eletropaulo, 
Uruguaiana etc (Brazil), Gener (Chile), CAESS etc 
(El Salvador), Merida III (Mexico), EDC 
(Venezuela) 
CDC Globaleq UK Finance, state-owned Southern Cone Power, Generandes (Peru), Cobee 
(Bolivia), San Isidro (Chile),  
Goldman Sachs USA Finance, private San Pedro de Macoris (Dominican Rep) 
Dolphin Argentina Finance, private Transener (Arg) 
Petrobras Energia Brazil Energy, state-owned Transener, Transba, Yacylec Enecor Edesur (Arg) 
 
3. Employment and labour issues 
The main effects on labour can be categorized under four broad headings: 
- the background, including protection agreements 
- the impact on pay and conditions, especially through outsourcing 
- the effects on employment and on employees 
- other issues, including union rights 
 
 Each section is based on a review of existing published evidence. This evidence covers privatised companies 
in a number of countries, and covers a number of companies which are owned by the Spanish multinationals.    
 
This data will be improved by further data that will be collected from the unions over the life of the project.   
 
3.1. Protection of  employment and agreements on pay and conditions 
 
3.1.1. Protection of workers existing conditions 
In Argentina, efforts were made to protect workers‘ employment.  All staff were transferred to the new 
companies at privatisation, so there was no immediate loss of jobs. There was provision for retraining. 
Compensation payments were made to workers. But these provisions were worthless without effective 
political and regulatory action, which was not forthcoming. In practice companies were permitted to 
downsize as much as they wanted. Even when a new government came to power in 1999, it decided to 
investigate corruption in the privatisation processes, but not to investigate the damage done to the workers. 17   
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In Colombia, the existing collective agreement continued to apply to those employed at the time of 
privatisation, but not for new workers, who are employed under a different contract with less pay and less 
security.  This has created a two-tier workforce.  18 
 
3.1.2. Collective agreements 
In Argentina, collective bargaining agreements covering the whole of the electricity sector were ended and 
replaced by separate negotiations with each company. Further fragmentation was caused by outsourcing of 
various operations in each company. Union membership became divided, reduced and vulnerableas a result. 
 
 
3.1.3. Workers’ share ownership and representation.  
Worker shareholdings have been an integral part of almost all privatisation projects in Latin America. It is 
generally regarded as a tactic designed to co-opt employees into the process and reduce trade union 
resistance. In Argentina employees were assigned between 2% and 12% of the shares as part of the 
privatisation process; in Chile between 6% and 10%. In Brazil, Rio de Janeiro state offered workers up to 
10% of shares, at a 30% discount, plus the right to elect representative onto the board. 19 
 
3.2. Outsourcing 
 
3.2.1. Argentina 
In addition to layoffs and redundancies, the private companies have systematically used outsourcing to 
reduce the workforce, reduce labour costs and increase labour flexibility.  
 
In Argentina, companies used outsourcing to drive down working conditions, in the areas of system 
maintenance, personnel, invoicing, collections, etc.  Work which had been performed by direct employees 
was outsourced through the formalisation of two-year outsourced contracts with labour cooperatives, in 
exchange for a monthly payment estimated for the contracted period. At the end of the two year period, the 
principle  company  usually demanded lower pay rates and conditions as a condition for renewal of the 
outsourcing contract. The workers were forced to accept these less favourable conditions or lose the contract 
altogether. 
 
In order not to be laid off, workers agreed to accept voluntary severance, then accepted a contract with the 
company to do the same tasks but as a self-employed person.  The workers lost the security of the employer-
employee relationship and had to provide for his or her own future pension. The company saved money by 
reduced  social contributions and only having to hire the workers when considered necessary.20 
 
3.2.2. Colombia 
In Colombia, as in Argentina, the privatisation terms included shares for workers and a scheme of voluntary 
retirement. However, a year after the unbundling and privatisation, the distribution company Codensa started 
dismissing workers, contrary to collective agreements, but the unions were unable to win jobs back.  
Workers so dismissed lost a job, were unlikely to be re-employed, and they and their families lost healthcare 
benefits.21 
 
The company also introduced systematic outsourcing: by 2002 about 7000 workers were on these contracts, 
with worse working conditions, casualisation and the loss of union organization: ―outsourcing is a form of 
labour without collective bargaining, which reduces salaries and structurally weakens unions as the reduction 
in direct employment rates decreases the number of workers joining unions.‖22  This practice also worsened 
quality because outsourcing service providers compete by offering low prices in order to get the job, and as a 
consequence they use poor equipment and non-expert personnel. 
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3.2.3. Panama 
Union Fenosa have deliberately used outsourcing as a way of cutting jobs in their Panamanian subsidiaries: 
―the outsourcing process, which is expected to be completed in 2005, will cut the required labor force by 
over 230 employees‖.23  
 
3.3. Changes in conditions: longer hours, reduced pensions 
 
In Argentina, the working hours were increased from seven hours and fifteen minutes to eight hours a day, 
without extra pay. In addition, the working day continues without interruption until problems are solved or 
until the total of programmed tasks are finished. 24 
 
Older workers have been asked to agree to reduced working time and payments until their retirement date, 
which effectively guarantees their retirement without any redundancy payment and reduces the company‘s 
pension liability. 25 
 
3.4. Jobs and unemployment 
 
3.4.1. Job Losses in Argentina  
 
 Privatisation of transmission, distribution and generating companies led to massive job losses. 
 
Employment in SEGBA, the former distribution company for Buenos Aires province, was reduced by 12% 
before privatisation and then by a further 62% over the next 7 years. By June 1999 there were only 6,618 
workers – only one-thrid of the 20,000 employed by SEGBA before privatisation.  
 
Table 6.  Job losses in SEGBA  
Date Enterprise 
Number of 
Workers 
(in thousands) 
% reduction  from 
privatisation level 
Pre-privatisation SEGBA 20,000  
At privatisation: June 1992 SEGBA 17,600 ------- 
June 1993 7 privatised enterprises 11,000 6,600 – (37.5%) 
June 1994 7 privatised enterprises 9,858 7,742 – (44%) 
June 1996 7 privatised enterprises 8,272 9,328 – (53%) 
June 1998 7 privatised enterprises 7,040 10,560 – (60%) 
June 1999 7 privatised enterprises 6,618 10,982 – (62.4%) 
Source: APJAE (2000) 
 
In the northwest region the transmission network was taken over in January 1994 by Transnoa S.A., formed 
by the private enterprises IATE and BANCO FEIGIN-TECSA, and by the trade union Luz y Fuerza,  taking 
on the commitment of not downsizing at least for two years. But the company immediately started 
manouevring to reduce the permanent staff: employers would induce the workers to apply for a ―voluntary‖ 
resignation, be given significant sums of money to set up service cooperatives, which would then bid for 
contracts to supply services to Transnoa. The cooperatives, formed without preparation or management 
training, failed within a few months: and the BID Bank, where the workers had deposited the money from 
their ―voluntary‖ resignation agreements, went bankrupt, leaving a significant number of workers in a critical 
situation. By March 2000 the number of employees had fallen to 134 from a total of 341 at the time of 
privatisation.  
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The workers employed by the generators in the north-west region were reduced from 1024 to 359 by the year 
2000, first by early retirements and voluntary resignations and then by further cuts after privatisation. 
 
Table 7.  Job losses in privatised generators in north-west Argentina 
SOURCE ENTERPRISE 
ENTERPRISE TO BE 
PRIVATISED 
PRIVATISED ENTERPRISE 
AGUA Y ENERGÍA ELÉCTRICA 
CENTRAL TÉRMICA  BARRANQUERAS 
Number of workers (X1): 272 
Voluntary resignations and retirements: 55 
 
 
Number of workers (X1): 272 
Voluntary resignations and retirements: 55 
 
SISTEMA DE GENERACIÓN 
DEL NOROESTE 
ARGENTINO 
CENTRALES TÉRMICAS DEL NOROESTE 
ARGENTINO S.A. 
Number of workers (X2): 217 Number of workers 
on the first day (X3): 
217 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of workers in 
January 2000: 0 
AGUA Y ENERGÍA ELÉCTRICA 
REGIONAL NOROESTE 
 
Number of agents (X1): 377 
Voluntary resignations and retirements: 206 
 
TRONCAL DE 
DISTRIBUCIÓN 
TRANSNEA S.A. 
Number of workers in the 
Business Unit (X2): 151 
Number of workers 
on the first day (X3): 
151 
Number of workers in 
January 2000: 78 
TRANSMISION 500 Kv TRANSENER S.A. 
Number of workers in the 
Business Unit (X2): 20 
Number of workers 
on the first day (X3): 
20 
Number of workers in 
January 2000: 9 
AGUA Y ENERGÍA ELÉCTRICA 
INGENIERÍA REGIONAL NORESTE 
 
Number of workers (X1): 92 
Voluntary resignations and retirements: 70 
EVALUACIÓN DE 
RECURSOS 
EVARSA 
Number of workers in the 
Business Unit (X2): 14 
Number of workers 
on the first day (X3): 
14 
Number of workers in 
January 2000: 5 
SERVICIOS DE 
INGENIERÍA 
TRANELSA 
Number of workers in the 
Business Unit (X2): 8 
Number of workers 
on the first day (X3): 
8 
Number of workers in 
January 2000: 7 
AGUA Y ENERGÍA ELÉCTRICA 
DIVISIONAL FORMOSA 
Number of workers (X1): 283 
Voluntary resignations and retirements: 30 
 
SISTEMA DE GENERACIÓN 
DEL NOROESTE 
ARGENTINO 
EDEFOR S.A. 
Number of workers in the 
Business Unit (X2): 353 
Number of workers 
on the first day (X3): 
353 
Number of workers in 
January 2000: 260 
Source: APJAE (2000) 
 
- Employees at Central Hidroeléctrica Diamante were cut from 80 in 1994 to 48 in 1999  
 
- At Central Térmica Sorrento S.A. staff were reduced from 243 at the moment of privatisation  in 
1993, to 65 in 2000. This downsizing was carried out in several ways: ―voluntary resignation‖ was 
accepted by 71 workers, 4 outsourcing contracts were drawn up, 40 workers were transferred to 
Empresa Provincial de la Energía (EPE), another 40 workers formed the EMLyF (Empresa de 
Mantenimiento Luz y Fuerza) —a micro undertaking—, being paid only a part of their indemnities, 
6 workers retired; and the situation of other 15 is pending, without incomes and with a possibility of 
being transferred to EPE under unknown conditions. 
- The working day was extended to 8 hours from Monday to Friday for maintenance and 
administration; shifts are 6-hour long and there are 10 full-time employees who work ten hours a 
day. The maintenance workshops (mechanical, electric, machinery workshops, boilers, etc.) have 
only one supervisor, because all the tasks were outsourced.   
 
- At Hidronor, out of the 558 employees transferred to Transener. at the moment of privatisation, there 
were only 123 workers by the year 2000.  There was also an increase in the divorce rate and two 
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suicides: one after twenty seven months of an unfruitful search for work, and the other after eighteen 
months unemployed following the privatisation.  
 
- At Central Térmica Alto Valle jobs were cut from 78 in August 1992, when it was privatised, to 31 
in September 1999, despite a 100% increase in capacity. The total of layoffs was due to: six retired 
workers, nine ―voluntary‖ resignations, three resignations, and twenty nine dismissals. In March 
2000 out of the 47 workers laid off 7 were still unemployed, 10 were employed elsewhere, 12 were 
self-employed , 7 retired, and there was no information on 11.  
 
- At Central Hidroeléctrica Cerros Colorados 100 employees in Augst 1993 were reduced to 49 
employees by September 1999.  The reduction was acheived by 1death (classified as work-related 
accident), 10 resignations, 11 ―voluntary‖ resignations, and 29 dismissals. By March 2000, of the 51 
workers who left, 1 died, 26 were unemployed, 18 employed elsewhere, 8 were self-employed, and 
no information on 1.  
 
- In Provincia Rio Negro staff were reduced from 880 to 280 in two stages, first by the sale of the 
company to the province, and then by the sale to Camuzzi. 
 
Table 8.  Loss of jobs in five power stations 
Enterprise Workers    
 Transferred at 
time of 
privatisation 
Layoffs Employed 1999 % of total jobs 
lost 1992/3 - 1999 
Central Térmica 
Alto Valle S.A. 78 47 31 60 
Hidroeléctrica 
Cerros Colorados 
S.A 100 53 47 53 
Hidroeléctrica 
Chocón S.A. 188 128 60 68 
Hidroeléctrica 
Alicurá S.A. 63 28 35 44 
Transener S.A. 558 435 123 78 
TOTAL 987 691 296 70 
Source: APJAE (2000) 
 
 
3.4.2. Job losses in Brazil, Chile 
 
In Brazil, the privatised distribution companies -  
CERJ, ELETROBRAS, ESCELSA and Light – all offered severance incentives, and on average cut jobs by 
30%   Similar cuts were made by the remaining state-owned companies: FURNAS, the Federal generating 
and transmission company for the centre and south, stopped recruiting from 1994; offered incentives for 
retirement and voluntary departure; and developed outsourcing, so that by the end 1995, the company had 
1,413 contract workers carrying out technical and operating tasks, an arrangement referred to as "temporary 
replenishment of the workforce".26 As the table below shows, heavy job cuts were made in distribution 
companies in Brazil, both before and after privatisation.  
 
Table 9.  Job losses in Brazilian electricity distribution companies 
 Jobs 
before 
Jobs 
after 
 
CERJ 5700 2160 Cuts made after privatisation, 1996-1997 
ESCELSA 2500 1717 Cuts made after privatisation, 1996-1997 
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COELBA 7231 4736 Cuts made 1992-1997, before privatisation. 
CEMIG 19891 14800 Cuts made 1992-1997, before privatisation. 
CESP, ELECTROPAULO, CFL 50700 30900 Cuts made or planned 1995-1997, before privatisation. 
Source: Saravia 1998 
 
In Chile, the greatest job losses came before privatisation: between 1974 and 1986 the number of employees 
in state-owned companies fell by 40%.  
 
3.5. Effects on workers 
Table 10.  Workers laid off at three power stations in Argentina: status in March 2000 
Details Central Térmica Hidroeléctrica Cerros Hidroeléctrica Total 
  Alto Valle S.A. Colorados S.A. Chocón   
Unemployed 7 26 11 44 
Employer-employee relationship 10 18 31 59 
Self-employed 12 8 4 24 
Retired 7 0 3 10 
other / unknown 11 1 79 91 
TOTAL 47 53 128  
Source: APJAE (2000) 
 
 
The impact on workers in Argentina can be summarised as follows: 
 Those who set up as cooperatives or companies of the self-employed to take on work from their previous 
employers, largely failed, partly due to lack of training for their new role. 
 Compensation payments were made in instalments, and so became rapidly worthless in a period of high 
inflation.  
 The remaining workers were employed in much smaller companies, under pressure to make rapid 
savings on labour costs, and so encouraging higher paid staff to leave, which had the effect of cutting the 
―knowledge chain‖ – a loss noticed in the 10-day blackout suffered by Buenos Aires in 1999. 
 Those who departed were under great pressure to do so, and suffered loss of self-esteeem as a result. 
 
In Colombia, workers laid off were also unlikely to be re-employed, and they and their families lost 
healthcare benefits.  27 
 
Box: Impact on workers lives 
 
Alberto M., Mendoza, Argentina, September 1999 
―After 38 years of working for Agua y Energía Eléctrica, I found myself in the dilemma of  whether 
accepting a ―voluntary‖ resignation  (not ―voluntary‖ at all, because I was pressured to accept it), or keeping 
on fighting in defence of my job. The mobbing destroyed me psychically, to the point of considering myself 
useless to perform my job. The events of that time are so traumatic that remembering them makes me 
shudder. I had always worked honestly, expecting to retire with honours when the moment came. 
My health —deteriorated by stress— could not bear any more, and I eventually accepted the ―voluntary‖ 
resignation. Today, at 58 years of age, having enough years of service but not the required age of 65 
stipulated by law, I can not retire, nor can I be reinstated because the electricity market is totally polarised. 
Nobody takes advantage of my training, what I learnt to do during nearly four decades. I support my family 
on occasional jobs. I‘ve even stopped paying our healthcare insurance. I am a person that worked hard to 
attain an upper-level post, who achieved it by my own effort, and who lost it due to a market reorganisation 
that I do not understand and which is destroying me and my colleagues‖.  
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A leader of the APJAE union San Rafael branch, western zone, 25th February 2000: ―As all members of this 
union know, my co-worker Carlos Alberto Stocco used to work, during the last phase of Agua y Energía 
Eléctrica, in the Transmission department, job which he carried out efficiently, reaching Category 15, and 
working full-time. Parallel to this, he was the President of the San Rafael APJAE Branch. By the time the 
privatisations took place, the Transmission department was given to a concessionaire and transferred to the 
enterprise Transporte de Energía Eléctrica por Distribución Troncal de Cuyo S.A., Distrocuyo S.A. At the 
new enterprise Mr Stocco and another member of this union, Alberto Sardi, were persuaded to disaffiliate 
from our trade union ―because the new management did not want unionists‖. However, they were notified 
that the new enterprise did intend to arrange an ―internal union‖. In exchange, they were promised 
promotions and pay increases, or, otherwise, they were threatened with dismissal. In this situation they 
resigned from the union. A year later, once the protection time established by the labour law was over, both 
were dismissed without any explanations. Both workers then set up —together with other former co-workers 
in the same circumstances— a service company, which did not however succeeed in bringing the necessary 
profits for them to support their families. They compensated this by doing other activities, from which they 
obtained good results, but the economic problem was not the only consequence they suffered. The loss of his 
job caused one of them a psychological problem that translated into a profound depression and which, after a 
long treatment with no results, led to his suicide‖.  
 
Source: APJAE (2000) 
 
4. Political, social and economic risks   
The processes of privatisation and liberalisation have led to a number of problems which can be observed in 
Latin America and the rest of the world. They can be summarised under six main headings: 
- failure to deliver promised new investment  
- absence of competition even after liberalisation 
- economic crisis and unsustainable ‗dollarisation‘ clauses 
- cost to governments and consumers 
- performance failures 
- popular and political resistance 
4.1. Fails to provide new investment 
Private sector investment in energy infrastructure has declined worldwide, and many multinational 
companies have withdrawn, due to losses and uncertainty. Investment finance still mainly comes from within 
each country and region, not from international capital: foreign investments are usually supported by state 
guarantees and so may not be additional but simply a relatively expensive replacement for domestic public 
borrowing.28  
 
The consulting firm Deloitte treats political opposition as one of two key factors for the fall in private energy 
investment worldwide (the other factor being the losses experienced by companies in both developing 
countries, including India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Argentina, and in developed countries, eg California). 
Deloitte noted  ―Growing political opposition to privatisation in emerging markets due to widespread 
perception that it does not serve the interests of the population at large”, which they attributed to a number 
of features of privatisation: “Pressures to increase tariffs and cut off non-payers; loss of jobs of vocal union 
members that will be hard to retrain for the new economy; the perception that  only special interests are 
served - privatisation is seen as serving oligarchic domestic and foreign interests that profit at the expense of 
the country…”29   
4.2. No effective competition 
A wide-ranging review by an UNCTAD official concluded that effective competition is rarely achieved, and 
the state is usually too weak to effectively regulate the private sector.  It concludes that “in a long-run 
development perspective, full-scale privatisation of gas and power sectors in developing countries entails 
significant risks, and therefore a flexible policy approach is preferable to a rigid commitment to extensive 
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liberalization”30  Other critiques of the process have found that reforms focus on short-term financial issues, 
ignore social and environmental public interests, an undesirable path that cannot be corrected.31 
 
There is a decreasing faith in the market‘s ability to provide infrastructure services, and few politicians now 
support it. 32 A number of developing countries have suspended plans for liberalisation and privatisation as a 
result of opposition and review of experience: these include Mexico, and Brazil.  In Mexico, this was partly 
because the constitution specifies that electricity must be within the public sector.33 
4.3. Economic Crisis  
In Argentina, privatised utility contracts were ‗dollarised‘, which guaranteed the companies the right to take 
revenue in dollars, so protecting them against currency fluctuations.  However, in the wake of the economic 
collapse, the Argentine government cancelled the dollarisation clauses, and imposed a freeze on utility 
tariffs, thus passing the cost of devaluation on to the utility companies.   
 
The companies have since then been seeking to deal with the issue either by abandoning their operations in 
Argentina, or by taking claims against the Argentine government to the World Bank's International Center 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (60 cases pending), or hoping to negotiate easier terms. So far the 
government has maintained a hard position. 34   
4.4. The public costs of private electricity 
Many private power stations (IPPs) have become expensive debt-like burdens because they are underpinned 
by government guarantees, which mean that the state has to pay for expensive electricity, even when it does 
not need it. As a result prices are forced up, or else the state has to carry the burden of supporting these 
private contracts.   Privatised distributors have also created unsustainable price increases.35 The Dominican 
Republic and Costa Rica are two examples of this process and its damaging impact.  
 
The Dominican Republic privatised its electricity companies in 1999, selling shares in the power stations, 
and, separately, selling 50% stakes in the 3 regional distribution companies – 2 of them  to the Spanish 
multinational Union Fenosa, for a total of $211 million.  The power companies increased charges by 51 
percent, the distribution companies began to withhold payment of electricity bills in protest against 'abusive 
rates' , the government tried to protect consumers from 42% of the price rises which added $5million per 
month to the costs of the state-owned transmission company CDE.  Without the consumer price rises, the 
distributors could not pay, the power companies made increasing power cuts, and there were riots. In 2003 
the government paid Union Fenosa $434 million to renationalise the distributors, which led to disputes with 
the IMF, which insists on electricity price rises.  The costs of dealing with the problems has exceeded the 
initial revenues from the privatisations – and the country still suffers from widespread power cuts. 36 who 
won, who lost?   
 
In Costa Rica, the electricity utility the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) paid private generators 
more than if the company had produced the electricity itself. The country's Comptroller General declared that 
clauses relating to rates levels in 15 power purchase agreements (PPAs) with independent power producers 
(IPPs) lack legal status because rates levels and adjustments sought to guarantee profits of the private sector, 
and not to ensure economic benefits to the country or consumers, as the 1990 law on electric power 
generation required them to do.37 The generators‘ association said that: ―These were the rules of the game 
and under these we took part … The correct thing to do is let the contracts complete their established terms 
and then we can go to work with new rules to be defined.‖38 
 
These problems have been experienced elsewhere in the world. In Europe, the EU has banned some PPAs 
because they are in effect subsidies from governments to the private companies (eg in the case of Poland). In 
Indonesia, Pakistan and India, private power stations have imposed financial burdens on public distribution 
authorities.  
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4.5. Performance problems  
Privatised companies have not improved performance in the way that was promised. In some cases the 
reliability of the system has worsened, with major power cuts occurring after privatisation. The two worst 
cases were in Rio de Janeiro and in Buenos Aires in the late 1990s.  
 
There were repeated power cuts in Rio de Janeiro at the end of 1997 and the beginning of 1998. Light - the 
electricity company privatised to a consortium of USA and French companies - was the focus of a storm of 
public complaints. The company was described by a government minister as "an embarrassment to the 
privatisation programme". 39 A second privatised company, CERJ, was also fined. 40   
 
Edesur,  the privatised Buenos Aires electricity power distributor,  faced fines of $60m levied by government 
regulators, ENRE, following a 10 day power cut in February 1999, affecting large parts of the city, due to a 
fire at an Edesur  sub-station. The 10 day blackout - the longest outage in Argentinean history - affected 
more than 500,000 people, and caused angry demonstrations as people were without light, air conditioning 
and water at the height of summer.  Edesur serves 2.1 m customers.41 
 
Blackouts have also been experienced in developed countries following liberalization, including California in 
2001, north-east USA and Canada – including New York and Toronto -, UK, Sweden, Denmark and Italy in 
2003. 42 
 
4.6. Resistance to Privatisation  
Apart from the dynamics of the response to crisis in Argentina, and the approach of the PT government in 
Brazil, there has been significant resistance to electricity privatisation throughout Latin America (and in the 
rest of the world). Ownership has become more concentrated, jobs are lost or made less secure, prices often 
rise and people are cut off for non-payment. Privatisation becomes unpopular, is seen as benefiting elite and 
corrupt  interests at home and abroad, and as “fundamentally unfair, both in conception and execution.” 43 
Some examples from Latin America include the following: 
 
 In Costa Rica, plans to privatise the electricity and telecoms sectors were delayed in 2000 after 
strikes and demonstartions led by trade unions. Protests action involved up to 100,000 people, the 
largest such mobilization in Costa Rica in nearly 30 years.44 
 In Ecuador, government attempts to privatise electricity assets have repeatedly encountered 
organised resistance including unions, provincial and local governments, indigenous organizations 
and others. In 2002, these campaigns forced the abandonment of proposals to sell electricity 
distributors, after Ecuador's Congress passed a resolution rejecting the privatisation, and a 
Constitutional Court ruling that the sales were unconstitutional. A further attempt at privatisation 
was abandoned in February 2004 when there was not a single tender for any of the companies.45  The 
utility Emelec - which was in limbo after the former owner, businessman Fernando Aspiazu, was 
charged in 2000 for irregularities in the administration of his bank Progreso - is being taken into 
public control by the city of Guayaquil, rather than being sold.46  
 In Peru, the privatisation of generating companies, which began in 1995, has faced powerful 
opposition. In  June 2002 there were riots in Arequipa after two electric power plants (Egasa and 
Egesur) were sold to  Tractebel. The government was forced to suspend the sale, and Tractebel 
backed out of the deal. 
 In Colombia, there has also been resistance, notably in defence of the well-established municipal 
utilities. The campaign to prevent the privatisation of Emcali, the utility in Cali, has been led by the 
union SINTRAEMCALI  and won worldwide support. (These campaigns have persisted despite the 
continued attacks on Colombian trade unionists -  two trade unionists from SINTRAEMCALI, were 
critically injured in a letter bomb attack in June 2004).  
 In Mexico, successive attempts to privatise the electricity system have been defeated by campaigns 
led by the trade unions, resulting in court rulings and parliamentary decisions which have prevented 
the president from implementing privatisation plans. 
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There has also been powerful resistance to energy privatisation globally.  There have been a number of cases 
where policy has been reversed, especially in middle income countries: in 2004 South Korea suspended its 
previous policy to develop liberalisation, Thailand also postponed its plans for privatisation of the electricity 
company as a result of a strong union-led campaign, and Indonesia‘s electricity privatisation law was 
scrapped following a court ruling that it was unconstitutional.     
 
5. Conclusions and policy issues 
The issues faced by electricity trade unions in Latin America include both (1) the employment and 
conditions of workers, including trade union rights and organisation;  and (2) the social, economic and 
political impact of the privatisations. 
 
The employment issues include policies of outsourcing and casualisation which are being operated in a 
number of different countries by a number of different multinationals. Other issues include increases in hours 
of work, separation of workers from the coverage of a sector-wide agreement.   
  
The social, economic and political issues include basic questions. Has the privatisation and restructuring 
delevered the investment and performance promised? Does privatisation require price rises that are not 
socially sustainable? Are there political alternatives available? Can the international financial institutions like 
the World bank be persuaded to finance development of the industry without promoting privatisation? 
 
These issues may be pursued by each union in its own country. There may be the possibility for concerted 
action by unions in relation to the policies of specific multinational groups, such as Union Fenosa or Endesa 
or Iberdrola. \this action can be concerted with the unions representing workers in the gome country of the 
companies, such as CCOO; and/or through international confederations, such as PSI. 
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